The TSA was created for one purpose and one purpose only: To remove liability from the airlines if someone tries to blow up a plane or bring a weapon onto one for evil purposes. (At the same time as it was created, the airlines had liability retroactively removed after 9/11; without that, they'd have been sued into smoking craters by the families of the 3,000 people who died.)
The fact is, nobody in this country has been willing to die to blow up an airplane since 9/11. If there had been just ten people willing to do so, then, from the statistics, nine planes would have been blown up, and, when the tenth guy was caught, he would have blown up the airport instead.
The TSA is a failure, and an infringement of civil rights besides. Everyone responsible for it, up to and including members of Congress, should, by all rights, be fired and forfeit all salary and pension benefits.
I think this is a critical point. Intelligence seems like a much more effective means of security than physical security. Of course we have to debate the relative merits of intelligence if there are tradeoffs with liberties/freedoms.
Honestly, I'm not sure that the it could have been demonstrated that the airlines were liable for the losses.
Consider that everysingle other hijacking up to that point had ended peaceably. One of the many, many, many reasons that this attack was so successful was that it was novel and unexpected.
I don't know that it would matter whether it could have actually been demonstrated, in court, that the airlines were liable for the losses. With 3,000 grieving families looking for someone to blame, and any number of lawyers looking to cash in if they could get the airlines found liable, suits would have been filed, and the airlines would then have been obligated to defend those suits, which would have hit them hard with legal expenses, discovery expenses, and so forth, right when people were unlikely to be buying tickets, being afraid of another attack. How bad would the damage have been? There's no way to know; if it didn't destroy the airlines, it could easily have wounded them greatly.
This argument isn't convincing. Airlines have been bailed out -financially- several times before. If a suit happened to crush them, yet another infusion of taxpayer money to a critical piece of national infrastructure would have been made.
Moreover, if the govt. was actually concerned about airline liability, they could have done for the airlines what they did for the phone companies; granted retroactive immunity for any actions taken by the airlines up to 9/11.
no, not a failure..No planes blown up and No huge Airlines liability..like it or not the politicians who made the law do not have the same expectations we do
That statement is like saying "This antivirus works really well on my computer that's not connected to the internet, I haven't gotten a virus yet!"
If there was a threat, the TSA would probably do a pretty crap job at stopping it, every test that's been run against them shows it, not to even mention the myriad of people that accidentally bring a pistol, knife, or whatever through the checkpoint and discover it when they land!
To be honest, that's a huge fear of mine every time I'm waiting in a TSA line. What happens if they find a weapon and the person decides to use it right then and there? What happens if their equipment sets off a weapon? What happens if a domestic terrorist is trying to get back at the TSA directly?
Most of my flights are what Delta or United call "connector" flights, so there are only 40-50 people on the plane anyway. Not an attractive target, I would think. But standing in line at O'Hare, there could be 100+ people there. I'm not afraid of the TSA. I'm afraid of the massive crowd of people they create.
"The TSA is failing to defend us against the threat of terrorism. The only reason they've been able to get away with the scam for so long is that there isn't much of a threat of terrorism to defend against... Terrorists are much rarer than we think, and launching a terrorist plot is much more difficult than we think. I understand this conclusion is counterintuitive, and contrary to the fearmongering we hear every day from our political leaders. But it's what the data shows."
You're much more likely to get killed on the car ride to the airport than at the airport.
You're right. But there's something about standing in a high security area with these serious looking people wearing gloves and swabbing things and big x-ray scanners and leading people away in handcuffs and it puts all kinds of ideas in your head. It makes the threat of terrorism seem that much more real and prominent. And my mind says if it's going to happen, it's going to happen right here. Not up there.
I was just debating with my wife last weekend about how people are so terrified of guns when cars are so much more dangerous and random and senseless. But it's human nature to worry about danger when someone is actually threatening you with that danger. I worry more about accidents when someone is driving dangerously in front of me. I worry more about terrorism when someone is screaming at me to take my shoes off so they can check for a bomb.
> ...there's something about standing in a high security area...
High security areas take security screening seriously.
When an intoxicated man in a blue shirt can successfully impersonate a member of your security staff and perform multiple private screenings of (attractive, female) travellers [0], it's clear that you don't take security seriously.
You're right, security is a feeling as well as a reality and humans are not rational. I didn't mean to discount your feelings, only add some perspective.
I, for example, am scared of stranger violence. I know logically that if I were to be murdered/assaulted it would be much more likely to be someone I know who did it - but I still fear stranger violence more than what is rational.
Bruce Schneier (the author of this article) writes a lot about this:
You are far more likely to be killed by your children then by terrorists. You are more likely to die tripping over your couch in your living room then to be injured by terrorists.
The end-goal of terrorism is the psychological impact, not killing a few people more or less. And there's just something about airplanes that creates a larger psychological impact when they're hit. Maybe it's the thought of being stuck in one, helpless and with no way out. Or maybe they symbolize progress and freedom, making traveling the world so easy. Whatever it is, that's what the terrorist attacking airplanes are going for.
Busses and trains are not magically immune to explosives. Especially when they have literally zero security and you could easily bring an entire suitcase full of dynamite onto them. The fact is, there just aren't enough people interested in that who have the necessary skills to actually obtain explosives without alerting the FBI to their existence.
If you just want to blow something up there's nothing even all that special about "transportation". Planes are special, because they have an unusual characteristic; taking control of a plane gives you an extremely powerful weapon that you can point anywhere and deliver incredible destruction. There aren't very many other things that two or three people can do that will credibly take down a skyscraper.
As it gets harder to deliberately crash a plane and there's ever more drive-by-wire, though, that threat diminishes, and the airport threat diminishes with it. Hypothetically if planes were completely ground-controlled, there would basically be no reason for airport security at all... blowing up planes isn't that intrinsically interesting, really. There'd be a certain amount of inertia to the concept, but that's it. (Yes, I know it used to be done, but post-9/11 I can't help but think that terrorists would view that as a pathetic second-best effort now.)
(Though I'd appreciate some serious security around the ground control station, though. Taking over one plane is one thing... taking over "all the planes in the area" or even "all the planes in the sky" would be something else!)
Is the TSA really doing anything to prevent someone from taking control of a plane though?
Post-9/11, the cabin door is now shut and locked during most of the flight. I can't imagine a pilot or crew-member would open that door due to a terrorist threat, knowing what we do now (and that they would probably die anyway, if they opened the door)
The door has also been substantially reinforced. It's probably safe to bet that anyone who tries to break through will not be successful for a variety of reasons. :)
As I understand it, FAA regs require that there be two people in the cockpit at all times. So, the Germanwings tragedy would very likely not have happened in the US.
That would be true if at all times meant 100% all times. But I doubt that this rule exists and is assumed to exist to keep the pilot himself from causing harm. But rather to notice medical conditions as soon as possible. So from this psychological stance it is very likely that there will be moments of maybe no more than a minute of someone being alone in the cockpit - realistically.
Pre-9/11 airplane hijackings were a moderate inconvenience. At worst you wind up in Cuba or something and have to find a way to get home. Post-9/11, and by post-9/11 I mean literally hours after the towers were struck, passengers knew better than to comply with hijackers, which is why Flight 93 ditched into the ground.
there's also the fact that it's easier to blow up a plane. you need a big bomb to destroy a bus but only a small bomb to make a hole in the plane and kill everyone. and the plane has way more people on it than a bus.
A hole in a plane's fuselage or wing doesn't mean that everyone dies. You need a lot of power in order to take out a wing. Remember that wings on commercial jetliners are designed to eat an entire disintegrating jet engine in order to protect passengers in the fuselage.
Additionally, a jetliner's fuselage can take a VERY large hit at cruising altitudes and speeds [0] and still leave the plane flightworthy.
Planes are tougher (and their crews better prepared) than people think they are.
True, however I would imagine that an attack on an airport would hurt more than an attack on a bus or train depot; I'd wager that flights might get grounded until everything is sorted out. Nobody's going to shut down New York's Penn Station if something happens in Chicago or San Francisco.
I really wonder why this hasn't happened yet. I can only assume that either terrorists are maniacally fixated on the airplanes, or there are approximately zero intelligent terrorists.
9/11 certainly was pretty unusual, but packing a suitcase with explosives and nails and hauling it into a crowd of civilians is the sort of thing that happens fairly regularly in some parts of the world.
Bostonianish person here: it hasn't changed Boston. My brother-in-law was running the Marathon that day, he finished about 30 minutes before the explosions.
Watertown residents' cars are no longer universally decorated with "W Strong" stickers. The feds had to strain mightily at the jury pool to get jurors willing to consider the death penalty -- sentiment in Massachusetts was 2:1 in favor of having Tsarnaev rot in prison.
Insofar as the Tsarnaevs had a political goal, I don't think they achieved it.
The Boston maraton bombing cost a fuck ton to clean up and deal with too - many thousand times as much as the enemy used (what 100 dollars worth of cooking ware?).
> 9/11 certainly was pretty unusual, but packing a suitcase with explosives and nails and hauling it into a crowd of civilians is the sort of thing that happens fairly regularly in some parts of the world.
Sure, but the places where it happens anything that could even remotely be described as fairly regularly in parts of the world where the social and economic conditions and legitimate political outlets for dissatisfaction with those conditions are all vastly different than in the part of the world that has the TSA doing screening at airports, i.e., the US.
While it has happened at times in the US (e.g., Boston Marathon), it doesn't happen enough that the expected number of times it would be expected to have happened in airport lines if such events were even distributed among similarly-sized crowds would be anywhere close to 1.
I think it hasn't happened yet because there are very few people who actually WANT to do that. The TSA and other security agencies would have you believe that the world is full of mass murderers. Based on the evidence, I'd say that's not true.
>If somebody wants to kill air travelers, TSA screening checkpoint line is the most attractive target.
My other favorite example is that in a lot of buildings, including school buildings, the standard fire drill AND bomb evacuation drill has everyone move outside, often into a single area which is far less controlled than the building being evacuated.
Assuming they could get one there in time, no I wouldn't doubt it. Not sure how deliberately murdering hostages is constitutional but then neither is most of what the government is doing.
How many jets patrol the US mainland now? What is their response time?
I am assuming the white house has AA, but what about congress?
If required, the murder of innocents strapped to or contained within a weapon of war is totally legal. It has been legal for hundreds of years.
I can't speak authoritatively, but jet response time to a breach of a sensitive no-fly zone is in the single-digit minute range. [0] I would be shocked if every major government facility wasn't surrounded by a no-fly bubble. I would be surprised if we didn't have the capability to send fighters to anywhere in the CONUS within ten minutes.
[0] Quite some time ago, I was living near Tacoma, WA when the POTUS was visiting. There was concern that an aircraft was going to enter the temporary no-fly zone around the POTUS, so a couple of jets from the nearby base were scrambled and cleared to go supersonic -maybe- 1,000 feet off the deck. The din and air pressure change was incredible; it was if a tremendously large bomb had gone off some distance away.
My favorite part about the TSA is that you can pay about $80, fill out some forms and show a couple of pieces of identification and now you can bypass most of their security. It's just a money making scheme; being able to pay money to bypass most of their security shows their security doesn't do anything useful (otherwise why would you be able to pay to bypass it?).
At $80-100 a throw, I'm not sure it's a very good money-making scheme. For starters, when someone enrols in the precheck program, they must undergo both a background check and an in-person interview... how much of the $80 fee do you suppose that leaves?
And even once approved, you're still subject to metal-detector scans upon boarding, you just get to skip the whole shoes-belt-laptop game. Oh and they can still "randomly" subject you to those checks if they want to. So I don't really agree that it's some crude "anyone can just pay and receive carte blanche access at the airport" scheme.
Here's another good one: for nationals of APEC member countries, there's the APEC Travel Card[2]. Frequent travellers can pay for one of these cards, and they gain access to dedicated expedited immigration queues (or, in the absence of a dedicated APEC queue at your airport, you get to use the pilot/aircrew lane). The card costs $150 and is good for 3 years.
For business travellers making multiple flights per week, access to programs like these is a godsend (I used to fly internationally at least once per week for work).
I do agree with you that all the "security theatre" stuff is a transparent sham, but the existence of programs like precheck isn't proof of that.
> At $80-100 a throw, I'm not sure it's a very good money-making scheme. For starters, when someone enrols in the precheck program, they must undergo both a background check and an in-person interview... how much of the $80 fee do you suppose that leaves?
So I haven't gone through it but several people I know have and all of them report that they fill out forms, show identification and that's it. The "interview" is always a very short questionnaire and background checks are incredibly cheap to do nowadays.
> And even once approved, you're still subject to metal-detector scans upon boarding, you just get to skip the whole shoes-belt-laptop game. Oh and they can still "randomly" subject you to those checks if they want to.
The metal-detector scan is incredibly fast, no one is ever in that line and you don't have to remove your laptops, shoes and other related equipment. You just go through and you're done 99% of the time.
> So I don't really agree that it's some crude "anyone can just pay and receive carte blanche access at the airport" scheme.
I don't agree with that either hence why I never said it so I'm not sure why you bring it up.
> ...how much of the $80 fee do you suppose that leaves?
"According to this TSA report [0], $14.50 of that [$85] fee pays for the FBI to run a criminal-records check, and the other $70.50 (83%) goes to the TSA for administration." (Via [1])
1) Precheck still sends you through the metal detector / scanner and still X-rays all your stuff. It's probably 99% as effective in that that regard.
2) The background check they do probably makes it more secure than a normal screening. What the chances that a cornfed, midwestern woman who likes baseball, cherrypie, and is crazy 'bout Elvis tries to hijack a flight?
In fact that sort of scrutiny is how Israel does their airport security. The reason America doesn't is because giving the fifth degree to [muslims/political radicals/other ethnic groups] is illegal and unpopular.
Why wouldn't they? A large majority of terrorists end up having no prior record. It's not like a background check goes and talks to family or friends, checks references, etc (a SSBI will but a regular background check does not). A regular background check is almost entirely useless.
While we're at it, can we be allowed to carry bottles of water through security? At least in Europe, having to pay 3€ for a 50cl bottle of water after passing through the checks is clearly just a money-making scheme and has nothing to do with stopping terrorism.
I learned that from one of the TSA line prep barkers. They were putting such a jolly spin on their spiel and it sounded so ridiculous that I assumed it was a joke. But, both happily and sadly, nope.
When I travel, I bring an empty cycling water bottle with me and send it through the x-ray with the top off so it's obviously empty. Once through security, I fill it up in a water fountain and hydrate for free.
Yes, I do this too. Incredibly, a lot of airports only have hot water in the bathrooms. Or sinks designed in such a way that a bottle can hardly be filled at all.
Only place I've seen that had an actual bottle-fill station was Copenhagen airport in Denmark. But in many ways that airport felt like it was 10 years ahead.
Pittsburgh, Chicago, Dallas Love Field and Dallas DFW all have special places in the water fountains for large water bottles. Of course it is generally cold as it is in the US and we like our beverages below room temperature ;)
I'm not sure about Europe, but in the US we can carry an empty bottle through security.
I did once accidentally leave a large, full bottle of contact lens solution in my carry on, though, and it passed right through. Maybe that's the trick.
I typically don't bother to remove "liquids and gels" from my baggage. The detection rate is less than 50%, and even then, they'll only find the most obvious offending water bottle (or whatever). You shrug, say "whoops", and move on.
You could probably claim contact lens solution as a "medically necessary liquid," which is exempt from the rules anyway.
>You could probably claim contact lens solution as a "medically necessary liquid," which is exempt from the rules anyway.
That's not a loophole that could be exploited. /s
On a side note, could one seek to get water treated as a medically necessary liquid? It is, and the rules say nothing about being limited to only counting medically necessary liquids that cannot otherwise be obtained on the other side of security.
I agree the security at LHR is far more intense. They caught a lighter and topical gel buried way down in a traveling medical kit I carry. I have gone through TSA 100's of times with this kit and they never once mentioned it.
I've stopped taking them out as well. The detection rate so far has been 0%.
The detection rate on a flask with vodka in it is slightly higher, which makes me concerned as to what other things you could bring with you as long as it's in an xray-opaque container.
Although for the record, a large full bottle of contact lens solution is permitted. It's an exception to the liquids rule.
Half the time, the TSA misses my solution bottle. The other half, they find it, have me open it, wave it under a chemical detector, and then send me on my way.
Contact lens solution is categorized like medicine and is exempt from the liquids rules. Once they did swab the outside of the bottle (for whatever they swab for?)
While I agree that the $7B spent on TSA is a waste, I can't agree with his conclusion that we should spend it on other security measures. That just leads to more "wiretap all the citizens" initiatives.
He does say "I'd rather see that money spent on intelligence and investigation". And I think it's evident from his other writings that "intelligence and investigation" refer to focused and targeted efforts, rather than dragenet surveillance.
One thing to note is that the testing was done by people with detailed knowledge of operational procedures, therefore they knew the weaknesses and took advantage of that. In other words, if you got 100 semi random travelers and tried to have them sneak things thru fewer than 95 would succeed.
Now, that's not to say the TSA isn't incompetent and shouldn't improve its procedures and policies, but rather the 95% is an exaggerated value.
One other observation to make. When driving down the highway over the speed limit and a patrol car becomes visible, it's quite clear the car would not catch every infringer, yet, nearly everyone slows to comply with speed limits. In other words, as Bruce says, you don't need 100% effectiveness for the system to be effective.
I got the opposite from the original CNN video. It appeared that they were using "basic" hiding techniques for these items. They weren't trying to go and reinvent the wheel by using techniques they know will get through TSA screening, but they used techniques that they figured TSA would be able to find, and they just failed.
I'm going to go re-watch the video to see if I missed something though. I'll edit this if I learn something new.
Edit: I looked for some more detailed articles and I found this quote, however it is coming from the TSA not the testing agency.
> The goal of the Red Team is to build tests that push the boundaries of our people, processes, and technology. We know that the adversary innovates and we have to push ourselves to capacity in order to remain one step ahead. With that said, our testers often make these covert tests as difficult as possible. It’s not like they’re using a cartoonish bundle of dynamite with an alarm clock strapped to it. These items are extremely hard to spot.
Edit 2: I'm an idiot the TSA was the screening agency, or at least these tests are frequently referred to as internal tests. I didn't know the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General (IG) was a part of the TSA.
Even if they were using full-on, ninja terrorist techniques, you would expect screeners to train to those standards. If they train to and pass those standards, then Joe Terrorist shouldn't be a problem.
They did use that excuse in the past. Lame after-the-failure excuse making.
But isn't it a risk/reward question? I slow down because to me the high risk of getting a $125 ticket isn't worth the ten minutes I'll save driving, if I see the police car.
However, if I were a nefarious evildoer, I may be willing to take a higher risk of getting caught in order to do whatever it is I want to do.
1. There is a vastly greater prevalence of drivers travelling over the speed limit than there are of airline hijackers.
1. It's trivially easy to distinguish vehicles travelling over the speed limit than hijackers. One might even suggest that speeding enforcemnt is significantly enabled by the ease, and low false-positive rate, of detection: speed radar.
So, if you were someone who wanted to get through the security with some kind of dangerous object, wouldn't it make sense to map out those weaknesses? Therefore they also need to be tested against.
Those operational procedures aren't secret knowledge though. Someone who really wanted to get something through can get their hands on that information.
My last TSA check took < 5 minutes, everyone courteous and professional. Ain't no thang. The bigger ballache for me (I live in the UK) is waiting at customs, sometimes 90 minutes in a line.
I just re-entered the US via JFK last night. There was an employee going up and down the line promoting "Global Entry" (skip the line). All I could think was how utterly farcical the whole thing came across.
Global Entry is for immigration/customs, not TSA security.
The trade-off is: they do a background check and take some biometrics, and in exchange you can skip the conversation with an immigration agent where they ask you where you're been, etc. - you just answer the usual customs-form questions at a kiosk.
It's actually a pretty reasonable trade-off, and speeds the process of going through Customs - which, unlike some of the TSA stuff, is in no way unique to the US (having gone through immigration/customs in 20+ countries, I can say with some experience that the US is far from the worst...)
The fact is, nobody in this country has been willing to die to blow up an airplane since 9/11. If there had been just ten people willing to do so, then, from the statistics, nine planes would have been blown up, and, when the tenth guy was caught, he would have blown up the airport instead.
The TSA is a failure, and an infringement of civil rights besides. Everyone responsible for it, up to and including members of Congress, should, by all rights, be fired and forfeit all salary and pension benefits.