>Humans are statistical models too in an appropriate sense.
No, we aren't and I'm getting tired of this question begging and completely wrong statement. Human beings are capable of what Kant in fancy words called "transcendental apperception", we're already bringing our faculties to bear on experience without which the world would make no sense to us.
What that means in practical terms for programming problems of this kind is that, we can say "I don't know", which the LLM can't, because there's no "I", in the LLM, no unified subject that can distinguish what it knows and what it doesn't, what's within its domain of knowledge or outside.
>If you take the time to define "know", "think", and "deduct", you will find it difficult to argue current LLMs do not do these things
No, only if you don't spend the time to think about what knowledge is you'd make such a statement. What enables knowledge, which is not raw data but synthesized, structured cognition, is the faculties of the mind a priori categories we bring to bear on data.
That's why these systems are about as useless as a monkey with a typewriter when you try to have them work on manual memory management in C, because that's less of a task in auto completion and requires you to have in your mind a working model of the machine.
This is interesting philosophy, and others have better critiques here in that regard. I'm a mathematician, so I can only work in what I can define symbolically. Humans most certainly ARE statistical models by that definition: without invoking the precise terminology, we take input, yield output, and plausibly involve uncertain elements. One can argue as to whether this is the correct language or not, but I prefer to think this way, as the arrogance of human thinking has otherwise failed us in making good predictions about AI.
If you can come up with a symbolic description of a deficiency in how LLMs approach problems, that's fantastic, because we can use that to alter how these models are trained, and how we approach problems too!
> What that means in practical terms for programming problems of this kind is that, we can say "I don't know", which the LLM can't, because there's no "I", in the LLM, no unified subject that can distinguish what it knows and what it doesn't, what's within its domain of knowledge or outside.
We seriously don't know whether there is an "I" that is comprehended or not. I've seen arguments either way. But otherwise, this seems to refer to poor internal calibration of uncertainty, correct? This is an important problem! (It's also a problem with humans too, but I digress). LLMs aren't nearly as bad as this as you might think, and there are a lot of things you can do (that the big tech companies do not do) that can better tune it's own self-confidence (as reflected in logits). I'm not aware of anything that uses this information as part of the context, so that might be a great idea. But on the other hand, maybe this actually isn't as important as we think it is.
Yes, of course. I'm not trying to establish further argument or to criticise. But it isn't fruitful to have a conversation where both parties have different definitions in mind. Since my original comment referred to the mathematical definition, it is important for me to clarify that.
The rest of my comment is to try to find some middle ground, of which there is plenty in philosophy. If the raw theory of mind arguments for humans were already applicable for recognizing the limitations of LLM designs, we would be much further along than we currently are.
The position of Kant does not align with the direction modern neuroscience is heading towards. Current evidence seems to prefer decentralized theories of consciousness like Dennett's multiple drafts model[1], suggesting there is no central point where everything comes together to form conscious experience, but instead that it itself is constituted by collaborative processes that have multiple realizations.
>Current evidence seems to prefer decentralized theories of consciousness like Dennett
There is no such thing as consciousness in Dennett's theory, his position is that it doesn't exist, he is a Eliminativist. This is of course an absurd position with no evidence for it as people like Chalmers have pointed out (including in that Wikipedia article), and it might be the most comical and ideological position in the last 200 years.
> However, Dennett is not denying the existence of the mind or of consciousness, only what he considers a naive view of them
It doesn't seem like he's Eliminativist. It also seems like the criticisms rely on harping on about qualia, which is one of the sillier schools of sophistry. I'd need to see actual criticisms before believing that Dennett is pushing for something comical.
No, we aren't and I'm getting tired of this question begging and completely wrong statement. Human beings are capable of what Kant in fancy words called "transcendental apperception", we're already bringing our faculties to bear on experience without which the world would make no sense to us.
What that means in practical terms for programming problems of this kind is that, we can say "I don't know", which the LLM can't, because there's no "I", in the LLM, no unified subject that can distinguish what it knows and what it doesn't, what's within its domain of knowledge or outside.
>If you take the time to define "know", "think", and "deduct", you will find it difficult to argue current LLMs do not do these things
No, only if you don't spend the time to think about what knowledge is you'd make such a statement. What enables knowledge, which is not raw data but synthesized, structured cognition, is the faculties of the mind a priori categories we bring to bear on data.
That's why these systems are about as useless as a monkey with a typewriter when you try to have them work on manual memory management in C, because that's less of a task in auto completion and requires you to have in your mind a working model of the machine.