I don't disagree with the substance of your comment, but want to clarify something.
Lesswrong promulgated a seriously misleading view of Aristole as some fussy logician who never observed reality and was unaware of probability, chance, the unknown, and so on. It is entirely false. Aristotle repeats, again and again and again, that we can only seek the degree of certainty that is appropriate for a given subject matter. In the Ethics, perhaps his most-read work, he says this, or something like it, at least five times.
I mention this because your association of the words "absolutist" and "Aristotelian" suggests your comment may have been influenced by this.
ISTM that there are two entirely different discussions taking place here, not opposed to each other. "Aristotelian" logic tends to be more concerned with ontology -- measles causes spots, therefore if he has measles, then he will have spots. Whereas the question of probability is entirely epistemological -- we know he has spots, which may indicate he has measles, but given everything else we know about his history and situation this seems unlikely; let's investigate further. Both describe reality, and both are useful.
So the fallacies are entirely fallacious: I don't think your point gainsays this. But I agree that, to us, B may suggest A, and it is then that the question of probability comes into play.
Aquinas, who was obviously greatly influenced by Aristotle, makes a similar point somewhere IIRC (I think in SCG when he's explaining why the ontological argument for God's existence fails), so it's not as if this is a new discovery.
I consider Aristotelian logic to be a category. It is the Newtonian physics of the logic world; if your fancier logic doesn't have some sort of correspondence principle to Aristotelian logic, something has probably gone wrong. (Or you're so far out in whacky logic land you've left correspondence to the real universe behind you. More power to you, as long as you are aware you've done that.) And like Newton, being the first to figure it out labels Aristotle as a certifiable genius.
See also Euclid; the fact that his geometry turns out not to be The Geometry does not diminish what it means to have blazed that trail. And it took centuries for anyone to find an alternative; that's quite an accomplishment.
If I have a backhanded criticism hiding in my comment, it actually isn't pointed at Aristotle, but at the school system that may teach some super basic logic at some point and accidentally teaches people that's all logic is, in much the same way stats class accidentally teaches people that everything is uniformly randomly distributed (because it makes the homework problems easier, which is legitimately true, but does reduce the education's value in the real world), leaving people fairly vulnerable to the lists of fallacies they may find on the internet and unequipped to realize that they only apply in certain ways, in certain cases. I don't know that I've ever seen such a list where they point out that they have some validity in a probabilistic sense. There's also the fallacies that are just plain fallacious even so, but I don't generally see them segmented off or anything.
Lesswrong promulgated a seriously misleading view of Aristole as some fussy logician who never observed reality and was unaware of probability, chance, the unknown, and so on. It is entirely false. Aristotle repeats, again and again and again, that we can only seek the degree of certainty that is appropriate for a given subject matter. In the Ethics, perhaps his most-read work, he says this, or something like it, at least five times.
I mention this because your association of the words "absolutist" and "Aristotelian" suggests your comment may have been influenced by this.
ISTM that there are two entirely different discussions taking place here, not opposed to each other. "Aristotelian" logic tends to be more concerned with ontology -- measles causes spots, therefore if he has measles, then he will have spots. Whereas the question of probability is entirely epistemological -- we know he has spots, which may indicate he has measles, but given everything else we know about his history and situation this seems unlikely; let's investigate further. Both describe reality, and both are useful.
So the fallacies are entirely fallacious: I don't think your point gainsays this. But I agree that, to us, B may suggest A, and it is then that the question of probability comes into play.
Aquinas, who was obviously greatly influenced by Aristotle, makes a similar point somewhere IIRC (I think in SCG when he's explaining why the ontological argument for God's existence fails), so it's not as if this is a new discovery.