> But as a result, we don't really know the languages or customs of other nations around the world well enough to do espionage
Where do you get that idea? Pretty sure there are several three-letter agencies in the US that would disagree with that statement.
Learning the language and customs of a foreign country to a deep enough level to fool even people looking for you into believing that you're a native doesn't seem like a remotely intractable problem.
Looking back on my statement in your quote, I concede; it is literally incorrect. We are absolutely willing to spend the cost to make programs that generate skilled HumInt operators, attract or ensnare local sources, and maintain intel alliances that enable us to do HumInt espionage. Our military doctrine essentially requires that we develop pipelines that can enable us to churn out competent linguists in any language [0].
My point was more that this isn't a deep part of our culture (the way it is in Russia), rather I think we spun up a lot of these programs after the national security apparatus failed to stop 9/11 or divert us away from a pointless war in Iraq. Based on the instant collapse of the Afghan government without US troop support, I can only conclude that we lacked sufficient HumInt capacity to understand that context well enough to form an enduring strategy.
So my point there is more that HumInt isn't one of our natural strengths, the way SigInt is.
Where do you get that idea? Pretty sure there are several three-letter agencies in the US that would disagree with that statement.
Learning the language and customs of a foreign country to a deep enough level to fool even people looking for you into believing that you're a native doesn't seem like a remotely intractable problem.