The issue isn't the TPM, it's who owns the keys to the machine. If the user configures their own keys, it becomes an empowering technology that allows them to verify their boot process hasn't been tampered with. If Microsoft owns the keys, they own the computer and the technology becomes their means of control over the user. They will use this technology to oppressively deny the user their software freedom while simultaneously extracting rent out of any developer who wants to reach that person.
Those who own the keys own the machine. We must ensure we are the ones holding the keys at all times or suffer the consequences.
Insightful analysis, though "oppressively deny" sounds harsh to me. There is not a blatant malice in TCG per se, mainly a neutral desire for control and by proxy profit. The treacherous versus trusted computing debate really does boil down to control. Do we trust vendors to be stewards of control on our platforms? Do we even have a choice?
I do not recall giving the keys to anyone, and yet it feels like the person building your house is telling you that they can pop in for dinner and lock you out should the need arise (deny you the ability to run your choice of software and your control is forfeit).
There is something flagrant when the question is brought home to the personal computer. No user complains too much about not being able to replace the firmware for some faraway BGP router, yet that router is also part of the infrastructure like the PC and the OS installed on it. If a consumer thinks about the PC less as providing a personal computing service and more as an Internet terminal, then the problem goes away a little. Naturally, the PC does both, but since the two are at odds with one another, the PC has conflicting interests, serving two masters.
A similar issue exists with cell phone debug, where the carriers log into your phone to troubleshoot. Granted, debug is control for the sake of helping the user and does not deny the user the ability to run software (the OS and app store do that).
This just leaves the problem of where can a user actually go to do secure compute. An abacus works nicely, but is impractical. Free open source hardware (FOSH) is really the only option.
> A similar issue exists with cell phone debug, where the carriers log into your phone to troubleshoot.
You cannot be serious. How do I know if this can happen to me?
> Free open source hardware (FOSH) is really the only option.
Yes.
> No user complains too much about not being able to replace the firmware for some faraway BGP router
The network is a very clear line to me. The BGP router is not my computer. It's the ISP who should be demanding free software from their hardware manufacturers, so that they too could enjoy complete control and trust.
> If a consumer thinks about the PC less as providing a personal computing service and more as an Internet terminal, then the problem goes away a little.
In these cases, the user is not using a computer. They're using appliances that just happen to have computers inside. Modern consumer products make every effort to hide the computer. There is no computing freedom if there are no computers we can use.
We must oppose all "consumer" products, all "fully integrated and converged" solutions. Computing is about simple parts in the form of hardware and software; from these parts, powerful systems emerge. Consumer appliances are these whole things that have swallowed up the entire system. They are indivisible, non-interoperable, uncontrollable, they only do what was foreseen by the corporation that made them despite the perfectly capable computer inside. I can't interface directly with the computer controlling my air conditioner, I need an infrared controller for that.
This article is linked from Stallman's website, it covers this matter with a lot of depth:
> We are giving up our last rights and freedoms for “experiences,” for the questionable comfort of “natural interaction.”
> But there is no natural interaction, and there are no invisible computers, there only hidden ones. Until the moment when, like in the episode with The Guardian, the guts of the personal computer are exposed.
> Every victory of experience design: a new product “telling the story,” or an interface meeting the “exact needs of the customer, without fuss or bother” widens the gap in between a person and a personal computer.
> The morning after “experience design:” interface-less, desposible hardware, personal hard disc shredders, primitive customization via mechanical means, rewiring, reassembling, making holes into hard disks, in order to to delete, to logout, to “view offline.”
The logistical problem of key exchange hasn't been solved. Boot viruses are very real, but the most severe threats is information extraction which works fine in user space.
I doubt I will activate TPM on my home PC as it doesn't offer much security to me. You can already say that some services will use remote attestations and I think these services can do without me.
Those who own the keys own the machine. We must ensure we are the ones holding the keys at all times or suffer the consequences.