Would be interesting if this gets through, though I imagine clickwrap agreements largely negate this anyway. Would be cool if informed consent required a snail mail agreement, might hurt adoption/growth metrics enough that big cos would stop being so greedy. Though that idea could backfire itself.
Besides that, multiple ways to read this. "Monarchies" could've been a reference to pre modern monarchies of which many made it through at least 3 successions. Or as a correction to the upper comment, saying that the Kim's are more monarchy than plain dictatorship.
I feel that way everytime I go for a walk in a well populated neighborhood, and there's nobody around. Or at work hearing about how people spend hours with their glowing walls of faces that talk endlessly about nothing, they say soon the faces will be able to talk back to!
I like to say low trust-worthiness societies. High trust societies are often exploited by con artists and the like who if sufficient then become low trust.
> Similar to how free speech doesn't mean you can yell “Fire!” in a crowded theater
While I appreciate bringing attention to ongoing changes in the tech/legal landscape, I'll get my rundowns from a source that doesn't blindly repeat this broken assertion. Doesn't speak well of their research practices.
Yeah, that quote was "mere dicta" from the first day (the case wasn't about shouting fire in a theater, it was about distributing pamphlets opposing the draft), and the actual holding of the case the quote is from was overturned more than half a century ago.
Hasn't stopped every authoritarian from parroting the quote whenever they want to censor something.
Despite its history, it’s still a valid example of an exception to the First Amendment under current law. The problem is that most people who cite it are using it as an analogy for something else that isn’t.
Including, from a modern free speech advocacy perspective, the original use of the analogy, which was about forbidding people from advocating resistance against a military draft!
> Despite its history, it’s still a valid example of an exception to the First Amendment under current law.
It's not. The current standard, set by Brandenburg v. Ohio, forbids speech which advocates imminent lawless action. It is a standard much broader than the Schenk case's threshold of clear and present danger.
> The problem is that most people who cite it are using it as an analogy for something else that isn’t.
Even the man who composed the the phrase did this. Schenk's "fire in a theater" aphorism was Oliver Wendell Holmes's attempt to persuasively discredit a group of Yiddish speaking anti-war pamphleteers in his non-binding legal commentary. The comparison is not a legal analysis nor is it itself a ruling on the merits of the case.
> Despite its history, it’s still a valid example of an exception to the First Amendment under current law.
Is it though? If you're putting on a play, and there is a fire in the script, e.g. in a play criticizing that decision, can the government punish you for putting on the play because of the risk it could cause a panic? If there is actually a fire in the theater, can they punish you for telling people? What if there isn't actually a fire but you believe that there is?
Not only is it useless as an analogy for doing any reasoning, the thing itself is so overbroad that even the unqualified literal interpretation is more of a prohibition than would actually be permissible.
None of your examples is what is meant by "Shouting fire in a crowded theatre." The quote is expressly about falsely shouting fire, not as part of the play, not as an honest act of attempting to alert people to a dangerous situation. The quote with more context is clear: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic..."
> If there is actually a fire in the theater, can they punish you for telling people? What if there isn't actually a fire but you believe that there is?
(IANAL) Law usually takes circumstance into consideration, and AIUI, usually comes to reasonable conclusions in this case. The Wikipedia article on this quote[1] goes into that:
> Ultimately, whether it is legal in the United States to falsely shout "fire" in a theater depends on the circumstances in which it is done and the consequences of doing it. The act of shouting "fire" when there are no reasonable grounds for believing one exists is not in itself a crime, and nor would it be rendered a crime merely by having been carried out inside a theatre, crowded or otherwise. If it causes a stampede and someone is killed as a result, then the act could amount to a crime, such as involuntary manslaughter, assuming the other elements of that crime are made out. Similarly, state laws such as Colorado Revised Statute § 18-8-111 classify knowingly "false reporting of an emergency," including false alarms of fire, as a misdemeanor if the occupants of the building are caused to be evacuated or displaced, and a felony if the emergency response results in the serious bodily injury or death of another person.
(It continues with other jurisdictions and situations.)
> None of your examples is what is meant by "Shouting fire in a crowded theatre."
Which is exactly the point, because they nevertheless literally are "shouting fire in a crowded theater".
> The quote with more context is clear: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic..."
Which is likewise why the people trying to use the quote all but universally omit the qualifiers -- it would otherwise be clear that, even in the context of Schenck, the constraint was intended to be narrow.
And even with the qualifiers, the original quote still doesn't do well with the first example or the third, because imposing a prior restraint under the hypothetical argument that people could get confused and panic is going to be a weak case when the reason someone is doing it is it to criticize the government, and it's quite objectionable to punish people for speech when they genuinely believe something to be true just because they've made an honest mistake.
Is the software/drivers for networking LLMs on Strix Halo there yet? I was under the impression a few weeks ago that it's veeeery early stages and terribly slow.
llama.cpp with rpc-server doesn't require a lot of bandwidth during inference. There is a loss of performance.
For example using two Strix Halo you can get 17 or so tokens/s with MiniMax M2.1 Q6. That's a 229B parameter model with a 10b active set (7.5GB at Q6). The theoretical maximum speed with 256GB/s of memory bandwidth would be 34 tokens/s.
> Mozilla is focused on deploying its roughly $1.4 billion worth of reserves to support “mission driven” organizations, according to a new report.
Back of the envelope math says that's worth 50-70 million dollars a year, taking into account inflation. A cracked developer is worth 1/2 a million per year, both of Mozilla's core offerings are OSS so benefit from free code contributions. Is that not enough for a dozen highly paid software engineers, a well paid CEO and infra? This is ignoring future donations.
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