I think the previous post is talking about a search that will find the sibling domain names that have obtained certificates with the same account ID. That is a strong indication that those domains are in the same certificate renewal pipeline, most likely on the same physical/virtual server.
Run ACME inside a Docker container, one instance (and credentials) for each domain name. Doesn't consume much resources. The real problem is IP addresses anyway, CT logs "thankfully" feed information to every bad actor in real time, which makes data mining trivially easy.
This is publicly publishing the account ID. There is an optional extension in RFC8659 that extends it but it isn't required by any implementer. This puts that ID into a public well known location that is easy to scrape and will be (this is exactly the kind of opsec info project like Maltego love to go lookup and pull in).
Very resource constrained systems, systems where consistent admin between *BSD and Linux is important. Containers where you have reasons to break the single process practice.
Visit eBay and search for "blocked IMEI" or variants. There are plenty of used phones which are IMEI locked due to either: reported lost, reported stolen, failed to make payments, etc.
I the lines between IMEI banning or blacklisting and the modern unlocking techniques they use have been blurred a little bit and so some carriers and some manufacturers don't really want to do or spend time doing the IMEI stuff and would prefer to just handle it all via their own unlocking and locking mechanisms.
After years of cargo-culting this advice—"run ssh on a nonstandard port"—I gave up and reverted to 22 because ssh being on nonstandard ports didn't change the volume of access attempts in the slightest. It was thousands per day on port 22, and thousands per day on port anything-else-i-changed-it-to.
It's worth an assessment of what you _think_ running ssh on a nonstandard port protects you against, and what it's actually doing. It won't stop anything other than the lightest and most casual script-based shotgun attacks, and it won't help you if someone is attempting to exploit an actual-for-real vuln in the ssh authentication or login process. And although I'm aware the plural of "anecdote" isn't "data," it sure as hell didn't reduce the volume of login attempts.
Public key-only auth + strict allowlists will do a lot more for your security posture. If you feel like ssh is using enough CPU rejecting bad login attempts to actually make you notice, stick it behind wireguard or set up port-knocking.
And sure, put it on a nonstandard port, if it makes you feel better. But it doesn't really do much, and anyone hitting your host up with censys.io or any other assessment tool will see your nonstandard ssh port instantly.
I've tried using a nonstandard port but I still see a bunch of IPs getting banned, with the added downside of if I'm on the go sometimes I don't remember the port
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